BOOKS

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The Shield of Nationality:
When Governments Break Contracts with Foreign Firms
Cambridge University Press (2015)

Winner, Best Book Award (2015-2017), International Political Economy Society
Based on dissertation awarded the Mancur Olson Best Dissertation in Political Economy (2011-2012), American Political Science Association 

There is extraordinary variation in how governments treat multinational corporations in emerging market countries. Governments around the world have nationalized, expropriated, or eaten away at the value of foreign-owned property in violation of international treaties. This is despite the common expectation that governments in developing countries do everything possible to reassure foreign firms and, at a minimum, to respect the contracts they make with foreign firms lest foreign capital flee. In The Shield of Nationality, I introduce foreign firm nationality as a key determinant of which firms take flight or fight when a government breaks contracts. Firms of the same nationality are likely to worry that their co-national’s broken contract is a forewarning of their own problems. This sense of shared political risk has two effects. First, firms of the same nationality lobby their diplomats to shield them from breach. Second, firms of the same nationality are more likely to divert their investments when the shield is pierced and a co-national firm faces a broken contract. In contrast, firms of other nationalities have little incentive to risk their defenses and are likely to meet the broken contract with apparent indifference. Supporting evidence includes cross-national quantitative analysis and case studies that draw on over 150 interviews with the heads of foreign firm subsidiaries and government actors in Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania, transition countries in which the presence of anti-market behavior is particularly surprising. Cases are further augmented by fieldwork in Russia and Azerbaijan. The theory’s counterintuitive implication is that a nationally diverse investor community can be a liability to foreign firms while providing an opening for governments to prioritize other goals over the property and preferences of foreign capital. [Replication Files for The Shield of Nationality]
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Production in the Innovation Economy
MIT Press (2014), Chinese translation (2019)

Production in the Innovation Economy (MIT Press 2014), co-edited with Richard M. Locke, resulted from an interdisciplinary research initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Our major takeaway is that the loss of small-scale manufacturing in the United States hamstrings the cutting-edge innovation in which the United States has a comparative advantage. For example, when innovation requires US firms to find overseas suppliers willing to produce small batches of redesigned components, US firms lose access to the ingenuity possible in tacit, immediate experimentation with local suppliers. See also the companion book by Suzanne Berger, Making in America.

 ARTICLES

19. ​“Coming to Terms: The Politics of Sovereign Bond Denomination.” (with Cameron Ballard-Rosa and Layna Mosley) International Organization. Forthcoming.

18. "Ownership and Trust in Banks: Evidence from the First Bank in an American Indian Nation." (with Donna Feir and Calvin Thrall*)  American Economic
Association (AEA) Papers and Proceedings. 111: 227-232. 2021. [Appendix].

17. "Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions, and Global Capital Cycles." (with Cameron Ballard-Rosa and Layna Mosley) British Journal of Political Science 51(1): 353-373. 2021.
Media coverage: Washington Post (link)

16. "The Price of Doing Business: Why Replaceable Foreign Firms Get Worse Government Treatment." (with Leslie Johns) Economics and Politics. 33(2): 209-243. 2021. [Appendix], [Replication Files].

15. "Incorporating Indigenous Nations into International Political Economy." Global Perspectives 2 (1): 1-5. 2021. [Peer-reviewed symposium contribution]
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14. "Judicial Economy and Moving Bars in International Investment Arbitration." (with Leslie Johns and Calvin Thrall) Review of International Organizations 15(4): 923-945. 2020. [Replication Data] and [R code].

13. "International Investment Law and Foreign Direct Reinvestment." International Organization 73(4): 839-858. 2019. [Online Appendix], [Replication Files] and [Supplementary Qualitative Data].

12. "How Government Reactions to Violence Worsen Social Welfare: Evidence from Peru." (with Renard Sexton and Michael G. Findley)  American Journal of Political Science 63(2): 353-367. 2019. [Online Appendix and Replication Files]
Media coverage: Axios Expert Voices (link), Political Violence @ a Glance (link)

11. "How a Retreat from Global Economic Governance May Empower Business Interests." (with Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. Pelc)  Journal of Politics 81(2): 731-738. 2019. 

10. "International Law, Territorial Disputes, and Foreign Direct Investment." (with David B. Carter and Paul Huth) International Studies Quarterly 63(1): 58-71. 2019. [Online Appendix]

9. "Sovereignty, Law, and Finance: Evidence from American Indian Reservations." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 14(4): 405-436. 2017. [Online Appendix and Replication Files]

8. "The Political Economy of US Territories and Indian Country." PS: Political Science & Politics 50(2): 510-514. 2017.

7. "Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment." (with Leslie Johns) American Political Science Review 110(1): 31-51. 2016. [Online Appendix] and [Replication Files]
Michael Wallerstein Award for Best Paper in Political Economy, American Political Science Association (for 2016)
Early draft awarded Best Paper in International Relations, Midwest Political Science Association (2014)

6. "Withdrawing from Investment Treaties but Protecting Investment." (with Clint Peinhardt) Global Policy 7(4): 571-576. 2016.
Media coverage: Washington Post (link)

5. "Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement." Journal of International Dispute Settlement 7(1): 117-135. 2016. [Dataset and Codebook]
Media coverage: ​Washington Post (link)

4. "Bondholders v. Direct Investors? Competing Responses to Expropriation." International Studies Quarterly 59(4): 750-764. 2015. [Replication Files]

3. "Investor-State Disputes: When Can Governments Break Contracts?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(2): 239-261. 2015. [Replication Files]
Media coverage: Washington Post (link) 

2. "Innovation in Tow: R&D FDI and Investment Incentives." Business and Politics 15(4): 467-491. 2013. [Replication Files]

1. "Aspects of the Political Economy of Development and Synthetic Biology." (with Gautam Mukunda) Systems and Synthetic Biology 3(1): 115-123. 2009. 
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​OTHER PUBLICATIONS

6. "Foreign Direct Investment." Entry, Oxford Handbook of International Political Economy (Editors: Jon Pevehouse and Leonard Seabrooke). 2021. [Extended bibliography, FDI research (2013-2019)]

5. “Bipartisan Spoilers Targeting EU Investment Policy: Continuity from Trump to Biden.” Prepared for: Trans-Atlantic Disruption: Challenges and Opportunities. Shapiro Geopolitics Workshop, Perry World House, The University of Pennsylvania. 25-26 January 2021.

4. "Community Banking Survey Report for the [Redacted] Nation." (with Donna Feir and Calvin Thrall) Completed for the government of [redacted] Native Nation, as well as the Center for Indian Country Development (CICD) at the Federal Reserve of Minneapolis. 2020.

​3. "Integrity Systems and the Rule of Law in Armenia: An Evidence Review." (with Michael Denly, Vepa Rejepov, and Michael Findley) United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2019. 

2. "Governance in Armenia: An Evidence Review." (with Michael Denly, Michael Findley, and John Gerring) United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2019.

1. "The Intellectual Commons and Property in Synthetic Biology." (with Kenneth A. Oye) Chapter in Markus Schmidt (editor), Synthetic Biology: The Technoscience and its Societal Consequences, Springer Academic Publishing. 2009.

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