BOOKS

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The Shield of Nationality:
When Governments Break Contracts with Foreign Firms
Cambridge University Press (2015)

Winner, Best Book Award (2015-2017), International Political Economy Society
Based on dissertation awarded the Mancur Olson Best Dissertation in Political Economy (2011-2012), American Political Science Association 

There is extraordinary variation in how governments treat multinational corporations in emerging market countries. Governments around the world have nationalized, expropriated, or eaten away at the value of foreign-owned property in violation of international treaties. This is despite the fact that we expect governments in poor countries to do everything possible to reassure foreign firms and, at a minimum, to respect the contracts they make with foreign firms lest foreign capital flee. In The Shield of Nationality, I introduce foreign firm nationality as a key determinant of which firms take flight or fight when a government breaks contracts. Firms of the same nationality are likely to worry that their co-national’s broken contract is a forewarning of their own problems. This sense of shared political risk has two effects. First, firms of the same nationality lobby their diplomats to shield them from breach. Second, firms of the same nationality are likely to divert their investments when the shield is pierced and a co-national firm faces a broken contract. In contrast, firms of other nationalities have little incentive to risk their defenses and are likely to meet the broken contract with apparent indifference. The theory’s counterintuitive implication is that a nationally diverse investor community can be a liability to foreign firms while providing an opening for governments to prioritize other goals over the property and preferences of foreign capital.

My evidence for these findings includes cross-national quantitative analysis and case studies that draw on my field research in Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania, transition countries in which the presence of anti-market behavior is particularly surprising. In the field, I conducted over 150 interviews with the heads of foreign firm subsidiaries and government actors. I demonstrate that firms of the same nationality as the “victim” firm divert investments after a government breaks its contract, and that a more nationally diverse investor community is associated with a higher likelihood of government breach of contract. The case studies show that co-national actors’ diplomacy and lobbying efforts in Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania are stronger when there are fewer nationalities of firms present in the host country. Cases are further augmented by fieldwork in Russia and Azerbaijan.

[Replication Files for The Shield of Nationality]
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Production in the Innovation Economy
MIT Press (2014), Chinese translation (2019)

Co-editor with Richard M. Locke, available here. For more information, see MIT Press or MIT PIE: Production in the Innovation Economy. See also the companion book by Suzanne Berger, Making in America.
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​ARTICLES

15. "International Investment Law and Foreign Direct Reinvestment." International Organization 73(4): 839-858. 2019. [Online Appendix], [Replication Files] and [Supplementary Qualitative Data].

14. "Judicial Economy and Moving Bars in International Investment Arbitration." (with Leslie Johns and Calvin Thrall) Review of International Organizations 15(4): 923-945. 2020. [Replication Data] and [R code].

13. "Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions, and Global Capital Cycles." (with Cameron Ballard-Rosa and Layna Mosley) British Journal of Political Science, FirstView, DOI: 10.1017/S0007123418000455.
Media coverage: Washington Post (link)

12. "How Government Reactions to Violence Worsen Social Welfare: Evidence from Peru." (with Renard Sexton and Michael G. Findley)  American Journal of Political Science 63(2): 353-367. 2019. [Online Appendix and Replication Files]
Media coverage: Axios Expert Voices (link), Political Violence @ a Glance (link)

11. "How a Retreat from Global Economic Governance May Empower Business Interests." (with Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. Pelc)  Journal of Politics 81(2): 731-738. 2019. 

10. "International Law, Territorial Disputes, and Foreign Direct Investment." (with David B. Carter and Paul Huth) International Studies Quarterly 63(1): 58-71. 2019. [Online Appendix]

9. "Sovereignty, Law, and Finance: Evidence from American Indian Reservations." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 14(4): 405-436. 2017. [Online Appendix and Replication Files]

8. "The Political Economy of US Territories and Indian Country." PS: Political Science & Politics 50(2): 510-514. 2017.

7. "Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment." (with Leslie Johns) American Political Science Review 110(1): 31-51. 2016. [Online Appendix] and [Replication Files]
Michael Wallerstein Award for Best Paper in Political Economy, American Political Science Association (for 2016)
Early draft awarded Best Paper in International Relations, Midwest Political Science Association (2014)

6. "Withdrawing from Investment Treaties but Protecting Investment." (with Clint Peinhardt) Global Policy 7(4): 571-576. 2016.
Media coverage: Washington Post (link)

5. "Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement." Journal of International Dispute Settlement 7(1): 117-135. 2016. [Current release of Dataset and Codebook]
Media coverage: ​Washington Post (link)

4. "Bondholders v. Direct Investors? Competing Responses to Expropriation." International Studies Quarterly 59(4): 750-764. 2015. [Replication Files]

3. "Investor-State Disputes: When Can Governments Break Contracts?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(2): 239-261. 2015. [Replication Files]
Media coverage: Washington Post (link) 

2. "Innovation in Tow: R&D FDI and Investment Incentives." Business and Politics 15(4): 467-491. 2013. [Replication Files]

1. "Aspects of the Political Economy of Development and Synthetic Biology." (with Gautam Mukunda) Systems and Synthetic Biology 3(1): 115-123. 2009. 


​WORK IN PROGRESS

"The Price of Doing Business: Why Replaceable Foreign Firms Get Worse Government Treatment." (with Leslie Johns) [Appendix]  Revise and Resubmit, Economics and Politics.

"Coming to Terms: The Politics of Sovereign Bond Denomination." (with Cameron-Ballard Rosa and Layna Mosley) Revise and Resubmit, International Organization. 

"Global Value Chains as a Constraint on Sovereignty: Evidence from Investor-State Dispute Settlement." (with Carolina Moehlecke and Calvin Thrall) Under review.

"The Promise of Foreign Direct Investment: Experimental Evidence from the First Bank in a Native Nation." (with Donna Feir, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and Calvin Thrall) Working paper.
 
The Politics of Sovereignty in the Global Economy: Making Sense of the Greater United States. Book manuscript, in progress.

Scientific Uncertainty and International Relations. Under contract, Cambridge Elements Series in International Relations.

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​OTHER PUBLICATIONS

4. “Foreign Direct Investment.” Entry, Oxford Handbook of International Political Economy (Editors: Jon Pevehouse and Leonard Seabrooke) Forthcoming (2020). [Extended bibliography, FDI research (2013-2019)]

​3. "Integrity Systems and the Rule of Law in Armenia: An Evidence Review." (with Michael Denly, Vepa Rejepov, and Michael Findley) United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2019. 

2. "Governance in Armenia: An Evidence Review." (with Michael Denly, Michael Findley, and John Gerring) United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2019.

1. "The Intellectual Commons and Property in Synthetic Biology." (with Kenneth A. Oye) Chapter in Markus Schmidt (editor), Synthetic Biology: The Technoscience and its Societal Consequences, Springer Academic Publishing. 2009.

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​MEDIA
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